There are few tragedies whose scale and severity evoke the trauma Americans associate with the Sept. 11 attacks, and fewer still that draw comparisons to the exact day. Hamas’ devastating rampage in Israel on Oct. 7 is one such atrocity. Lulled into a false sense of security with their high-security border defenses and renewed relations with Arab nations, Israelis were shocked by the brief but deadly Gazan incursion, having viewed such an attack as all but impossible. That shock, combined with the raid’s symbolic timing on both the anniversary of the Yom Kippur War and the Jewish holiday Simchat Torah, has prompted international condemnation and unabating Israeli retaliatory strikes. But should this attack, or something similar to it, have been so unexpected?
The roots of Hamas’ raid lay in the now 75-year-long Israeli-Palestinian conflict that ignited following the declaration of an Israeli state. Endless border skirmishes and, in some situations, full-blown wars have added layers of complexity to the dispute as territories change hands and ethnically diverse people find themselves under new rule.
The Gaza Strip, home to over two million and nestled between Egypt and Israel’s southeast corner, is one such territory. Annexed from Egypt in 1967 after the Six-Day War, the predominantly Palestinian area existed under Israeli military occupation until 2005, at which point it was allowed self-rule as an exclave of the Palestinian state. Elections in 2006 resulted in victory for Hamas, a Gazan group—designated by many states as a terrorist organization—whose primary objective is the establishment of an Islamic Palestinian state that includes Israeli territory.
Israel’s 2005 withdrawal from Gaza was not an indication of its willingness to totally disengage from the territory, however. As it became increasingly obvious that Hamas was not content to govern just Gaza, the Israeli government took measures to hinder Hamas’ ability to strike across the territory’s border. This culminated in a joint Egyptian-Israeli blockade that blocked the movement of both goods and people in and out of the territory, on the premise that such an action was necessary to prevent Hamas from acquiring more rockets to launch at Israel. Critics deride the blockade as having created the world’s largest open-air prison. Proponents counter that denying a terrorist group from acquiring sophisticated weapons is paramount to the security of the Israeli state and its people.
Herein lies the complexity of the conflict. While international groups argue that Palestinians have the right to a self-governed and sovereign state, it is impossible for Israel to allow such a state to exist unchecked when it is ruled by an organization that has proved itself both capable of launching and willing to launch attacks against Israel’s soil. Hamas’ modus operandi, the firing of rockets from Gaza at cities in Israel, forces a response, typically in the form of retaliatory airstrikes that further inflame anti-Israel sentiment in Hamas.
Thus, a powder-keg was developed: Hamas launches attacks against Israel because the group believes that the Israeli state is the only obstacle to Palestinian independence, while Israel fires back in order to prevent further attacks and defend its own right to exist. Ultimately, it was simply impossible for the two to coexist when the existence of one fundamentally threatens the existence of the other.The powder-keg was doomed to spark.
On Oct. 7 that spark arrived in the form of Hamas’ cross-border assault on a cluster of southern Israeli towns and military installations. Within hours, over 1,200 Israelis were slaughtered by Hamas operatives in their homes and at a music festival. Over 200 more were kidnapped and trafficked back to the Gaza Strip to be used as bargaining chips. This attack, while barbaric and unjustifiable, should not have been wholly unexpected by the Israeli authorities even within a period of calm, considering the existence of a status quo that was untenable to either party and balanced on one side by a terrorist group that had demonstrated its desire to strike at Israel.
It is pointless, however, to harp on the failures of Israeli intelligence considering that the past cannot be changed. Instead, it is time for Israel to look forward and determine how it can finally close this Gazan chapter of the tangled Palestinian conflict. Israel’s current response, relentless rounds of airstrikes against Gazan civilians, followed by a sustained incursion in Northern Gaza, is certainly not sustainable, particularly with mounting international calls for a ceasefire. Already, the conflict has killed over 11,000 civilians, a number which is certain to grow as recovery efforts continue. Furthermore, the IDF, or Israeli Defense Forces, have indicated that their ground operation is to be long and arduous, which will only further fan the flames of the growing anti-Israel coalition.
Israel’s current objective, the systematic elimination of Hamas in Gaza, requires the IDF to essentially act as an occupying force for a lengthy period of time, a strategy which has been proven disastrous by the American occupation of Afghanistan. Instead, Israel should scale back the breadth of its invasion, as well as its goals. A short but intensive series of operations intended to destroy Hamas’ major tunnel networks and weapon depots, as well as a campaign to target and eliminate the organization’s leaders, would be far more prudent.
This campaign would not result in the total eradication of Hamas as a political entity, but perhaps it wouldn’t have to. With its military capabilities seriously degraded, logistics network destroyed, and leadership in disarray, Hamas will be certainly unwilling, if not incapable, to launch further assaults on Israel. At this point, Hamas would simply be focused on keeping the organization from splintering.
Israel could then move into the second phase of their response: restoring the Palestinian Authority, or PA, in the Gaza Strip. It would be near impossible for Israel to successfully occupy Gaza for any extended duration of time, both strategically and diplomatically. The PA, which enjoys a degree of international recognition and already rules over the Palestinian West Bank, would not be viewed as a foreign occupier, nor does it hold the extreme views of Hamas. In fact, Israel could use the restoration of PA rule in Gaza as a bargaining chip to secure certain concessions, such as the right to continue military raids against Hamas remnants and international oversight over PA elections, making the group a possible partner for Israel in the future.
This strategy would avoid two pitfalls that Israel’s current strategy faces. The first is failure. It is very much possible, despite the IDF’s extensive capabilities, that Israel would fail to maintain control over an occupied Gaza, particularly as civilian resistance mounts. That would be disastrous, as it would both bolster Hamas’ ranks as well as potentially fuel the development of new insurgent groups that would further complicate the region. Smaller scale yet equally damaging operations, like those proposed above, have been effective in the past. Furthermore, Hamas’ leaders, hiding in southern Gaza bunkers, are currently only at risk once the invasion force has made its way across the region. Surgical and piecemeal strikes that can be launched deep into enemy territory are far more likely to succeed in decapitating Hamas’ leadership.
The second is international pressure. A continued Israeli occupation would be untenable for the majority of the world’s major powers, and Western opposition to the idea has grown steadily. Allowing the PA to reclaim authority over the Gaza Strip would demonstrate that Israel is not only avoiding a total annexation of Palestinian territory, but is also open to working with the PA in combating terrorist elements in the region. Such action would certainly calm diplomatic strife, and may even reopen the door to Israeli-Arab rapprochement initiatives.
Israel has been dealt an incredibly difficult hand. It is obligated to actively seek retribution and deterrence against Hamas, yet risks both military failure and international castigation in conducting an operation too extensive. By striking for a balance, launching surgical and destructive operations against Hamas assets while simultaneously restoring local, moderate rule to the region, Israel can avenge those massacred on October 7 and prevent a similar tragedy from recurring. Hamas’ attack certainly opened a new chapter in Israeli-Palestinian relations, but with a proper approach, Israel may yet transform this chapter into the beginning of a brighter, more bilateral future.
